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Summary
Given the fact that every maritime venture is exposed to continuous risks, it is necessary 
to create a hierarchic structure of its predictors and to manage them efficiently. In view 
of that, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) suggests the possibility of risk 
management through the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). The key element in the 
implementation of this method is to determine the optimum point of investment in risk 
reduction with the purpose of achieving the balance between the costs of protective 
measures and the profit. Although it may be inappropriate to discuss the price of a 
human life, it is nevertheless possible to calculate it by formal mathematical procedures 
through the Cost of Averting a Fatality (CAF) and the Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality 
(ICAF). This methodology has allowed to produce – and to present in this paper – the 
above values for the Republic of Croatia for the very first time. In addition, by using the 
ϰ2 test, it has been possible to examine the relations between the observed actions 
(foundering, collision / impact, flooding, fire, disabled and adrift, man overboard) and 
the period (years 2006-2017). The results clearly show a statistically relevant dependence 
(ϰ2(88)=143,17; p<0,001) among the observed categories, which probably results from 
various implementation dynamics of the risk reduction measures that are performed in 
Croatia on a yearly basis. The results obtained by this research can provide important 
additional guidelines for the optimisation of the risk management model.
Sažetak
Uzimajući u obzir činjenicu da je svaki plovidbeni pothvat izložen kontinuiranom 
riziku, nužno je na odgovarajući način hijerarhijski strukturirati njegove prediktore te 
njima optimalno upravljati. U skladusa spomenutim, IMO (eng. International Maritime 
Organization) nudi mogućnost upravljanja rizikom uz pomoć Formalne procjene sigurnosti 
(eng. Formal Safety Assessment - FSA). Pritom je ključan element implementacije te metode 
određivanja optimalne točke ulaganja u smanjenje rizika s ciljem postizanja ravnoteže 
troškova zaštitnih mjera i dobiti. Iako je neprikladno govoriti o cijeni ljudskog života, ona 
se formalnim matematičkim postupcima izračunava putem cijene sprečavanja pogibelji 
(eng. Cost of Averting a Fatality - CAF), te pretpostavljene cijene sprječavanja pogibelji (engl. 
Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality - ICAF). U radu su korištenjem prikladne metodologije po 
prvi put izračunate spomenute vrijednosti za Republiku Hrvatsku. Dodatno, korištenjem 
ϰ2 testa, ispitana je zavisnost broja promatranih akcija (tone, sudar/udar, naplavljivanje, 
požar, onesposobljen i pluta, čovjek u moru) i godine (2006.-2017.). Rezultati jasno pokazuju 
postojanje statistički značajne zavisnosti (ϰ2(49)=152,57; p<0,001) promatarnih kategorija, 
što je vjerojatno posljedica različitih implementacijskih dinamika mjera za smanjenje rizika 
koje se u Hrvatskoj provode na godišnjoj bazi. Rezultati ovog istraživanja mogu dati važne 









1. INTRODUCTION / Uvod
A vessel that is under way, with her crew and passengers, is 
frequently exposed to adverse weather conditions. Since 
ancient times, this has been the major reason for regarding 
maritime voyage as a dangerous venture. This has been 
supported by the fact that a vessel having an emergency 
situation is often far away from any assistance. Risky operations 
also include critical procedures during cargo handling, 
and these must also be taken into consideration. Practical 
examples indicate that the early detection of emergencies 
or extraordinary circumstances allows the crew to take all 
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available measures on time, in order to reduce the risk and 
avoid an accident.[8] However, although on-board crews are 
trained and ready to respond efficiently and on time, the real-
life cases prove that human error is still the most common 
cause of sea accidents.[4][5][6] According to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the risk is defined as the 
probability that an undesired event will take place, followed by 
a series of the resulting consequences occurring in real time.
[8] The consequences include threats to human life and health, 
and damage to property and environment. It is necessary to 
manage the risk efficiently in order to minimise it. This is the 
very reason for implementing the Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) as a risk management method recommended by IMO. 
The FSA methodology offers the acceptable risk measures 
for the loss of human life on board, as well as the ways of 
calculating its value. This will be further discussed in the paper, 
with a particular reference to the Republic of Croatia.[12]
2. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT / Analiza procesa upravljanja 
rizikom
The Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a risk management 
method recommended by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). Initially it had been proposed by the UK’s 
Marine Coastguard Agency (MCA), relying on the already 
accepted system of risk analysis applied in the offshore 
industry.[9] FSA is a process aimed at increasing safety at sea 
through preserving human life and natural environment. It 
allows a continuous analysis of the benefits and assessment 
of costs of risk reduction measures. It consists of five essential 
stages:[18]
1. Identification of hazard,
2. Analysis of risk,
3. Risk control measures,
4. Assessment of cost benefit, and
5. Conclusions and recommendations (Figure 1). 
The first step comprises the analytical and creative 
techniques for hazard identification and monitoring. By using 
analytical elements, previous experience and background 
data (lists of hazards, analytic data, dangerous substances, 
etc.) are taken into consideration. The use of creative elements 
ensures that the process is proactive and not limited only to 
the hazards that have occurred so far. It consists of structured 
group reviews of experts from relevant areas, who try to 
identify the causes and consequences of maritime hazards and 
accidents. The hazards are then arranged by priorities in order 
to discard the scenarios that are deemed to be less relevant. 
Therefore, this stage results in a list of hazards and scenarios 
ranked by priorities, given their causes, consequences and 
the above mentioned risk assessment. Hazards can now be 
grouped as very probable or frequent, reasonably probable, 
hazards of remote probability, and hazards of extremely 
remote probability (Table1). The method of assessing the risks 
presented in Table 2 can be applied depending on the risk 
category.
Source: Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for the Use in the IMO Rule-Making Process, MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392, IMO, London, 
UK, 2002, p. 15.
Figure 1 Process of risk management / Flow chart of the FSA methodology
Slika 1. Proces upravljanja rizikom / Dijagram toka FSA metodologije
Table 1 Example of the hazard probability categorisation
Tablica 1. Primjeri kategorizacije vjerojatnosti nastupa opasnosti
Hazard probability category Very probable (frequent) Reasonably probable Remote probability Extremely remote probability
Type of event Likely to occur once in six 
months
Likely to occur once in 
five years
Likely to occur once in 
the lifetime
Less than 1%
events per person to occur 
during their lifetime
Source: Hess, M.; Kos, S.; Njegovan. M.: Procjena i kontrola operativnih rizika na brodu u skladu s ISM pravilnikom / Assessment and control of operational 
risks on board in line with ISM rulebook, in: Pomorstvo, University of Rijeka – Faculty of Maritime Studies, Rijeka, 2011, p. 411.
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The second step – risk analysis – is aimed at a detail 
examination of all relevant scenarios (including causes and 
consequences) that are identified in the first stage, by means of 
construction and quantification methods. This stage results in 
the identification of the high-risk areas. 
The third step in the FSA methodology implies the analysis 
and proposal of practical and effective Risk Control Options 
(RCOs) with the purpose of creating the risk control options that 
are able to deal with the existing and the newly identified risks. 
This step includes the following stages:[12]
1. focusing on risk areas needing control,
2. identifying potential RCOs,
3. evaluating the effectiveness of the RCOs in reducing risk by 
re-evaluating the Step 2, and
4. grouping RCOs into practical regulatory options.
The goal of the fourth step is to identify and compare 
benefits and costs associated with the implementation of each 
RCO identified and defined in the previous step (Step 3). A Cost 
Benefit Assessment (CBA) comprises the analysis of the detected 
risks and the associated RCOs, the CBA for each individual option, 
and the ranking of RCOs. There are several calculation indices 
which express the value of human life and cost-effectiveness in 
relation to safety of life, such as Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality 
(GCAF) and Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (NCAF).
The last step (Step 5) refers to defining all objective 
recommendations which should be presented to decision 
majers. The recommendations contain careful and detailed 
consideration and ranking of all hazards and their underlying 
causes, comparison and ranking of Risk Control Options in terms 
of the associated costs and benefits, and the identification of 
those RCOs which keep risks as low as reasonably practicable. 
3. ANALYSIS OF THE LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE 
RISK ACCEPTABILITY ON BOARD / Analiza 
prihvatljivosti rizika gubitka ljudskog života na 
brodu
The analysis of measures and tolerability of risks deals with 
the cost effectiveness of these measures. This can be easily 
assessed in case of material risks, where a cost effective 
measure is the one whose value is greater than the value of an 
individual damage. Obviously, in case of human life or natural 
environment, the acceptability of investing in risk protection is 
hard to determine. However, the process can be facilitated by the 
guidelines developed and published by the UK governemnatal 
organisation Health and Safety Executive (HSE) whose main 
focus is the health and safety at work. The principle of ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) refers to a level of risk that is 
neither negligibly low nor intolerable high. ALARP is actually the 
attribute of a risk, for which further investment of resources for 
risk reduction is not justifiable. The principle has been approved 
by IMO and vaties according to the area of maritime shipping 
(Figure 2).Furthermore, the framework of FSA sets the following 
values of the human life risk acceptability:[10]
 - Maximum tolerable fatality risk to crew members - 10-3 per year,
 - Maximum tolerable fatality risk to passengers - 10-4 per year,
 - Maximum tolerable fatality risk to third parties (people ashore) 
- 10-4per year, and
 - Negligible risk - 10-6per year.
Table 2 Risk assessment according to the hazard probability category
Tablica 2. Procjena rizika ovisno o opasnosti
Hazard probability Level of hazard
Minor damage Moderate damage Major damage
Very probable VERY LOW RISK VERY LOW RISK HIGH RISK
Reasonably probable VERY LOW RISK MEDIUM RISK VERY HIGH RISK
Remote probability LOW RISK HIGH RISK VERY HIGH RISK 
Extremely remote probability LOW RISK VERY HIGH RISK VERY HIGH RISK
Source: Hess, M.; Kos, S.; Njegovan. M.: Procjena i kontrola operativnih rizika na brodu u skladu s ISM pravilnikom / Assessment and control of operational 
risks on board in line with ISM rulebook, in: Pomorstvo, University of Rijeka – Faculty of Maritime Studies, Rijeka, 2011, p. 411.
Source: Kontovas, C. A., Psaraftis, H. N.: Formal Safety Assessment: A Critical Review, Marine technology 46(1):45-59, 2009.
Figure 2 Individual fatality risk (per years) for crewmembers on board various types of ships, with the suggested criteria of the 
individual risk acceptability
Slika 2. Individualni rizik od pogibelji (godišnji) za posadu različitih vrsta brodova, prikazan s predloženim kriterijima prihvatljivosti 
individualnog rizika
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The analysis of maritime hazards and risks takes into account 
the categories of the Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk. The IR 
refers to the indivudual risk of death or injury at a given working 
location, while the Societal Risk refers to an average risk of 
accidents affecting many persons, i.e. the entire group that can 
be exposed to a hazard. The IR can be expressed as:[14]
                              (1)
Where:
F – frequency of the undesirable event,
P – probability of accident for person Y, and
E – fractional exposure of person Y to the given risk.
The assessment of the cost effectiveness of investing in 
the reduction of risk and the ranking of accidents are the 
issues affecting the assessment of the individual risk. The 
IMO recommends the following relations when creating a risk 
matrix: 1 fatality equals 10 cases of serious injuries, while 1 case 
of serious injuries equals 10 cases of minor injuries (Table 3). 
The frequency index represents the relation between the lower 
number of accidents with serious consequences and the higher 
number of accidents with minor consequences (Table 4). 
An analysis of Tables 3 and 4 results in the formula that is a 
preerquisite for creating a Risk matrix (Table 5):[13]                                             
                       (2)
Where:
RI – Risk index,
FI – Frequency index, and
SI – Severity index.
The risk matrix is a suitable means for ranking the risks, with 
the purpose of their cost-benefit assessment. However, practical 
use proves that the suggested matrix is not an ideal tool for risk 
ranking, because of errors that occur, for instance, due to the 
linear change in frequency of severity, unless the conditions 
and circumstances surrounding an accident have not been 
evaluated.
Table 3 Severity index
Tablica 3. Indeks posljedice
Severity index (SI)
SI SEVERITY EFFECTS ON HUMAN SAFETY EFFECTS ON SHIP S (equivalent fatalities)
1 Minor Single or more minor injuries Local equipment damage 0.01
2 Significant Multiple or severe injuries Non-severe ship damage 0.1
3 Severe Single fatality or multiple severe injuries Severe damage to ship 1
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities Total loss 10
Source: Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule-Making Process, MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392, IMO, London, UK, 2002, p. 43.
Table 4 Frequency index
Tablica 4. Indeks učestalosti
Frequency index (FI)
FI FREQUENCY DEFINITION F (per ship per year)
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10
5 Reasonably probable Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, i.e. likely to occur a few times during the ship’s life 0,1
3 Remote Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships, i.e. likely to occur in the total life of several similar ships 10
-3
1 Extremely remote Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) of a world fleet of 5,000 ships 10-5
Source: Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule-Making Process, MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392, IMO, London, UK, 2002, p. 43.
Table 5 Risk matrix




1 2 3 4
Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11
6 7 8 9 10
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9
4 5 6 7 8
3 Remote 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6
1 Extremely remote 2 3 4 5
Source: Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule-Making Process, MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392, IMO, London, UK, 2002, p. 44.
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Societal risk is typically expressed as a FN-diagram or 
through the so-called Potential Loss of Life (PLL). The PLL is 
defined as the expected value of the number of fatalities per 
year. PLL is a type of risk integral, being a summation of risk as 



















+=⋅Σ=      (3)
Where:
N – upper limit of fatalities in a single accident,
fN– frequency of accidents involving N fatalities, and
F1 – frequency of fatalities involving one or more victims.
4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE AND 
LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE ON BOARD / Komparativna 
analiza vrijednosti i gubitka ljudskog života na 
brodu
4.1. GCAF AND NCAF METHODOLOGIES / GCAF i NCAF 
metodologija
The cost of preventing the loss of human life on board can be 
expressed as the gross and net values, i.e. as GCAF (Gross Cost 
of Averting a Fatality) and NCAF (Net Cost of Averting a Fatality). 
It is deemed that, in practise, the advantage should be given to 
GCAF as it depends heavily on the costs of fatality prevention.
[7] NCAF also takes into account economic benefits from the 
Risk Control Options (RCOs) under consideration. This may be 
misused in some cases for pushing certain RCOs, by considering 
more economic benefits on preferred RCOs than on other RCOs. 










=                                      (5)
Where:
ΔC = Expected cost of the RCO (per vessel),
ΔB = Economic benefit (per vessel) as the result of the 
applied RCO (may also include pollution prevention) and
ΔR = Risk reduction (per vessel), i.e. reduction of fatalities in 
accordance with the implemented measures.
There is the co-called 3-million-US-dollars criterion that is 
applied in all recent FSA analyses and cost-benefit assessments 
using RCOs.[10]According to this criterion, the preferred RCO 
must have GCAF and NCAF values less than 3 million US dollars. 






= 3$3$   (6)
Whereby the parameters ∆C, ∆B and ∆R must meet the 
following relation:
BRmC ∆+∆⋅〈∆ 3$                                  (7)
Furthermore, under equal conditions, the GCAF formula is:
RmC ∆⋅〈∆ 3$                                           (8)
4.2. ICAF / ICAF
In recent years, the FSA analyses have been using the Implied 
Cost of Averting a Fatality (ICAF) which results from the Life 
Quality Index (LQI). The LQI is used for expressing the social, 
health, environment and economic dimensions of the quality 
of life at working conditions, and the formula expressing these 
values is:[3]
)1( ww egLQI −⋅=                                         (9)
Where:
g – gross domestic product per resident,
e – average life expectancy, and
w – economically active part of lifetime.
In case the proposed RCO is accepted, the value of the ICAF 
is established. The latter can be defined as an optimum amount 
of funds to be invested in order to prevent a fatal accident.
[1]These funds are larger in developed countries so that, for 
instance, they amount to around 5 million US dollars in the USA.
                               (10)
Where:
γ - gross domestic product per resident per year,
ε - average life expectancy, and
w - economically active part of lifetime (in developed 
countries: w≈1/8).
5. CALCULATION OF THE GCAF, NCAF AND 
ICAF VALUES FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA / 
Izračun vrijednosti GCAF, NCAF i ICAF za Republiku 
Hrvatsku
5.1. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MARITIME 
TRAFFIC AND MARITIME ACCIDENTS IN THE REPUBLIC 
OF CROATIA / Komparativna analiza pomorskog 
prometa i pomorskih nezgoda u Republici Hrvatskoj
Table 7 provides the data on maritime traffic (ship arrivals) over 
the period 2006 – 2017. It can be notices that the traffic of vessels 
increased from 223967 to 258670, i.e. an increase of 34703 arrivals. 
Table 8 presents the causes and number of performed search and 
rescue operations over the same period of time. It can be noticed 
that there was a drop in performed SAR operations following the 
year 2011, but there was an increase in performed SAR operations 
after 2014, in accordance with an increased number of ships in 
the same period. Figure 3 combines the data from Tables 7 and 
8 to show that the growth of SAR operations did not follow the 
growth of traffic proportionally (see Figure 3). In other words, 
after the year of 2011 the frequency of SAR actions decreased 
although the number of ship arrivals increased by 23000, while 
increased traffic after 2014 influenced the increase in performed 
SAR actions. 
Table 6 IMO cost effectiveness criteria for RCOs
Tablica 6. IMO kriterij isplativosti mjera za sprečavanje nezgoda
NCAF (million USD) GCAF (million USD)
Criterion covering the risk of fatality, injuries and ill health 3.0 3.0
Criterion covering only the risk of fatality 1.5 1.5
Criterion covering only the risk of injuries and ill health 1.5 1.5
Source: Formal Safety Assessment, Risk evaluation, Submitted by the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), MSC 78/19/2, IMO, 
London, UK, 2004, p. 10.
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Table 7 Flow of vessels in Croatia’s seaports (arrivals)
Tablica 7. Promet brodova u morskim lukama RH, prispjeli brodovi
Year
Total National flag Foreign flag Vessels in nautical ports
Vessels GT, ‘000 Vessels GT, ‘000 Vessels GT, ‘000 Permanently moored Transit
2006 223967 247560 217636 192887 6331 54672 13794 211782
2007 235489 267140 229005 204118 6484 63021 14099 220875
2008 248539 285045 241184 214343 7355 70702 14665 217024
2009 247547 278948 240990 210546 6557 68401 14801 203327
2010 235841 291421 229327 214753 6514 76668 14431 206028
2011 250918 296023 245266 217128 5652 78895 14286 188457
2012 247571 287782 242767 210368 4804 77413 14396 181457
2013 246939 299885 242122 215476 4817 84408 13735 182921
2014 258670 294261 253990 221354 4680 72906 13793 181322
2015 258670 294261 253990 221354 4680 72906 13399 182526
2016 258670 294261 253990 221354 4680 72906 13422 198151
2017 258670 294261 253990 221354 4680 72906 13433 201896
Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics, http://www.dzs.hr/
Table 8 Number of performed SAR operations
Tablica 8. Broj poduzetih akcija traganja i spašavanja

































































2006 3 7 17 34 3 88 13 - 109 274
2007 7 10 8 72 8 92 9 - 146 352
2008 6 2 1 32 8 81 9 1 139 278
2009 8 3 10 59 8 104 9 - 116 317
2010 20 9 8 43 8 105 14 - 166 373
2011 15 19 13 59 9 85 15 - 132 347
2012 18 23 7 60 8 59 6 - 82 263
2013 17 11 11 42 12 60 5 - 128 286
2014 11 23 7 60 8 59 6 - 168 342
2015 11 15 8 43 9 48 10 - 180 324
2016 7 17 8 59 8 86 13 - 249 447
2017 12 29 13 51 18 59 17 - 255 454
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The dependence of the observed operations has been 
examined by using the ϰ2 test. The produced results clearly 
indicate the dependence (ϰ2(88)=143,17; p<0,001) of the 
observed categories. This can be explained by various 
implementation dynamics of the Risk Control Options (RCOs) that 
are performed in the Republic of Croatia on a yearly basis. When 
referring to RCOs aimed at reduction of the risk of human life loss 
in Croatia, it is important to note the introduction of the Croatian 
Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System (CVTMIS). The 
system comprises the Automatic Identification System (AIS), 
maritime radar system, maritime radio-communication system, 
and other systems that allow the interaction with vessels and 
the control of navigation. The launch of the system started 
gradually in 2006 and by 2011 it was fully implemented, 
including the radar system as its integral part. There are three 
regional centers – Dubrovnik, Split and Rijeka. By comparing 
the data presented in Tables 8 and 9, it can be concluded that, 
after the implementation of CVTMIS, the number of maritime 
accidents has decreased in spite of the growing maritime traffic.
5.2. ANALYSIS OF THE NCAF AND GCAF VALUES 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA / Analiza izračuna 
vrijednosti NCAF i GCAF za Republiku Hrvatsku
When calculating the values of the NCAF and GCAF parameters 
for the Republic of Croatia, the following scenarios are taken 
into consideration:
 - Value of human life 0.5 mil USD1, and
 - Three fatalities per year2. 
The analysis of the presented scenario indicates that the 
annual cost of fatalities amounts to 1.5mil USD. The completed 
CVTMIS system was implemented by the end of 2011. The 
total investment amounted to about 7 million US dollars. It is 
expected that the fatalities will be reduced from 3 per year to 
3 in ten years. Taking this into consideration, the annual fatality 
cost is expected to drop from 1.5mil USD to 150,000USD per 
year, thus saving 1.35mil USD per year. Given the fact that the 
initial investment amounted to around 7mil USD, with the 
annual maintenance cost of around 100,000USD, the expected 
1 The assumed value based on the comparison with the developed countries, 
the estimated value of life and the life insurance claim pay-outs, and on the 
comparison of the assessed value of US and Croatian military staff in Afghanistan 
amounting to 600,000:50,000 USD, whereas the statistical value of human life, 
according to the US government, amounts to 5,000,000 USD.
2 According to the statistics of SAR operations for the year2014 in the area under 
the jurisdiction of the National Headquarters for Search and Rescue at Sea, which 
are related to ships from table 7.
return on investment is approximately 5.5 years.
By applying the already presented equations for the 
assessment of NCAF and GCAF, the following ΔR values are 
produced:
3 / 250.000 0,000012R fatalities year vessels∆ = ⋅ =
Upon the implementation of CVTMIS, fatalities have been 
reduced to three in ten years::
0,3 / 250.000 0,0000012R fatalities year vessels∆ = ⋅ =
The obtained difference of the variable ΔR between the 
initial and final value after the introduction of the abobe 
described measures amounts to 0.0000108.
The variable ΔB presents the difference between the 
initial cost, i.e. three fatalities per year (1.5mil USD) and three 
fatalities in ten years or, in other words, the amount of 1.35mil 
USD multiplied by the annual average of 250,000 vessels, and is 
expressed as:
1,35 250.000 5,4B milUSD vessels∆ = ÷ =
The investment cost of reducing the risk per vessel is 
presented by the variable ΔC. As the investment is 7mil USDand 
the amount being dividd by the average number of vessels, the 
resulting equation is:
7 250.000 28 /C milUSD vessels USD vessel∆ = ÷ =
If the obtained values are placed in interaction, then:
5.3. VALUE OF THE ICAF PARAMETER FOR THE 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA / Vrijednost parametra ICAF za 
Republiku Hrvatsku
The calculation of the Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality(ICAF) for 
the Republic of Croatia requires the following data:
 - γ – 14.000USD/resident[15],
 - ε – life expectancy 77.8 years[19], and
 - w – working life 31 years [20][21].
Source: Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure, http://www.mppi.hr
Figure 3 Inter-relation between the total accidents and the total ship arrivals
Slika 3. Međuodnos ukupnih nezgoda i broja dolaska brodova
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Theeconomically active part of lifetime (w) in Croatia takes 
into account the average of 8 working hours per day, 5 working 
days a week, and the working life of 31 yaers. The calculation 
can be expressed as:
31 8 5 48
59520 0,08757 0,1
679.660,877,8 24 7 52
hours days weeksyears
day week yearw hours days weeksyears
day week year
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= = = ≈
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
As it is considered that:






6. CONCLUSION / Zaključak
Despite the continuous growth of the global maritime shipping 
and the world fleet, the number of fatalities in sea accidents 
has been dropping. From the risk analysis point of view, there 
is a noticeable need for hazard detection at workplace in 
order to assess the risk and analyse all measures and options 
that can be applied to reduce the risk. As for the applied Risk 
Control Options (RCOs), their cost effectiveness is easy to 
determine when material risk is observed. The matter gets more 
complex and challenging when trying to assess the risks to the 
environment and human life. The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable) principle has been introduced as a response to this 
issue. It implies that the cost of RCOs has to be lower than the 
damage caused by the incident.
In order to make the application of FSA (Formal Safety 
Assessment) methodology efficient, it is essential to define 
all hazards and measures for reducing the risk. A detailed 
consideration of the FSA issues allows identifying the key tools 
for calculating the value of human life at sea, i.e. Gross Cost of 
Averting a Fatality (GCAF), Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (NCAF) 
and Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality (ICAF). Although the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has accepted the 
criterion of efficiency of the applied risk prevention measures 
amounting to 3 million US dollars, additional RCOs must be 
taken into consideration as, in maritime shipping, hazards often 
refer to environmental damage at the same time, so that the 
overall damage or cost is significantly larger than the value of 
human life.
The figures referring to the maritime traffic and accidents 
in the Republic of Croatia indicate a noticeable decrease 
in the overall sea accidents during the period 2006 – 2013, 
while during the period 2014 – 2017 there was an increase 
in sea accidents together with an increase in ship traffic. The 
most evident reduction of accidents was experienced after 
the introduction of the Croatian Vessel Traffic Monitoring and 
Information System (CVTMIS) in 2011. This research used the 
CVTIMS implementation as a RCO, i.e. as input information for 
calculating GCAF and NCAF in Croatia.
None of these parameters exceeded the limit of one million 
US dollars during the process of calculating and obtaining their 
final values for the Republic of Croatia. It can be concluded that 
even if the obtained values were beyond the maximum limit 
of 3 million dollars, the RC should be taken into account as the 
calculation refers only to reducing the risk to human life. If the 
above value is augmented by the value of reducing the risk of 
environmental pollution, then the benefits are multiple and 
the cost effectiveness is obvious. As for the calculation of ICAF 
parameters for the Republic of Croatia, the obtained value of 
2.45 million USD implies that the value of human life is lower 
than in the developed economies. Compared to Croatia, the 
value of life in the USA, according to their official parameters, 
amounts to 4.5 million USD. Clearly, a higher level of economic 
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